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CASE NO.
13957

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

Plaintiffs, as Trustees of a group insurance plan,
filed this action interpleading a $10,075.55 fund which was
created through refunds and dividends from insurance premium
payments by both Defendants.

During the time the fund accu-

mulated, Defendant-Respondent, Kaibab Industries, Inc., paid
$89,729.27 (92.2%) of the premiums and Defendant-Appellant,
J. E. Crofts & Sons, paid $7,571.31 (7.8%) of the premium
payments which were made to the Trustees on account of the
respective employees of each Defendant.

Later, Defendant-

Respondent, Kaibab Industries, Inc., terminated its participation in the insurance plan and requested distribution of
a pro-rata share of the fund.

Defendant-Appellant, J. E.

Crofts & Sons, objected making claim to the entire fund, and
Plaintiff Trustees asked the Court to determine proper distribution.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Both Defendants filed Motions for Summary Judgment.
The Court adopted the theory of a constructive trust awarding
Defendant-Respondent, Kaibab Industries, Inc., 92.2% of the
fund ($9,289.66) and awarding Defendant-Appellant, J. E.
Crofts & Sons, 7.8% of the fund ($785.89).

-2~
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Defendant-Respondent, Kaibab Industries, Inc.,
seeks affirmance of the proportionate awards to each Defendant allocable to their participation in the fund.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

For many years, the Trustees of the Utah Automobile
Dealers Association Group Insurance Plan, Plaintiff herein,
have operated an insurance brokerage providing group insurance
plans for the use and benefit of employees of its members and
subscribers.

Prior to December, 1964, the Plaintiff Trustees

maintained certain trust reserve accounts and equity accounts
under the name of "Pearson & Crofts".

One of said accounts

designated as Pearsons No. 2 resulted from payment of group
insurance premiums on employees at a sawmill and logging
operation located at Panguitch, Utah, operated jointly by the
Pearson family and the Crofts family.

(R. 44, 56)

On December

30, 1963, this business entity was incorporated as "CroftsPearson Industries". Alfred H. Crofts, Leo H. Crofts, John
M. Crofts and Jay H. Crofts each owned 1,500 shares of stock
and the Pearsons owned an equal number of shares therein.
(R. 123)

The corporate Defendant, J. E. Crofts & Sons, was

not at any time an owner of or shareholder in the corporation,
Croft-Pearson Industries.

The name of the corporation,

-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Crofts-Pearson Industries, Inc., was changed to Kaibab-Crofts
Industries by an amendment to the Articles of Incorporation
on August 26, 1965.

The name of the corporation, Kaibab-

Crofts Industries, was changed to Kaibab Industries pursuant
to Articles and Certificate of Consolidation on October 16,
1968.

By virtue of the issuance of said Certificates,

Kaibab Industries is the successor in interest of CroftsPearson Industries, Inc.

(R. 88, 123)

From and after July, 1965, the sawmill and logging
employees at Panguitch were on the payroll, employees of and
employed by Kaibab Industries and its predecessors and were
not at any time after said date on the payroll, employees of
or employed by J. E. Crofts & Sons, a corporation, or its
individual shareholders.

Each and all of the group insurance

premium payments for said employees were made by and charged
to the bank accounts of Kaibab-Crofts Industries and Kaibab
Industries.

During the same period, J. E. Crofts & Sons

made similar premium payments in behalf of a few persons
which it employed.

(R. 87, 88)

The Trustees' equity account, Pearsons No. 2,
pertaining to the employees of the Panguitch business entity
continued under that designation until March of 1967, at which
time the respective interests of the Pearsons and the Crofts
therein were resolved by agreement.

Thereafter, although

Kaibab Industries was already participating in the fund, the
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Trustees designated the account J. E. Crofts & Sons.
44-45, 56-58)

(R.

During this period of time, 1965, 1966, and

early 1967, the Panguitch company, Kaibab and its predecessors, was receiving and paying separate monthly statements
from the Trustees.

From March, 1967, to September, 1968,

Kaibab received statements under the designation J. E.
Crofts & Sons.

From September, 1968, to February, 1969,

when Kaibab Industries terminated its participation in the
fund, billings were received under the designation of
Kaibab Industries.

(R. 35-37, 42-46)

Following the settlement with Pearsons in March,
1967, it was determined that J. E. Crofts & Sons1 balance
in the equity account as of April 30, 1964, was $4,863.83.
However, the Trustees paid dividends to J. E. Crofts & Sons
in 1966 and 1967 totalling $4,851.72, an amount almost
identical to the original equity account balance.
Exhibit.)

(Letter

As a result, the interpleaded equity account

balance of $10,087.66 has been virtually all generated by
the group insurance premiums made by each of the Defendants
on account of their respective employees during the period
May 1, 1965, to April 30, 1969.
Exhibit No. 6 (R. 90-91) is a document of account
itemizing Kaibab Industries' premium payments to the Plaintiff
Trustees.

In calendar 1965, Kaibab made five premium payments

directly to Trustees totalling $9,635.25. During the calendar
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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years 1966, 1967 and part of 1968, Kaibab remitted 35
premium payments to the Trustees via J. E. Crofts & Sons
totalling $69,527.77 and from September, 1968, to February,
1969, Kaibab remitted payments directly to the Trustees
totalling $10,566.25.

During this same period, J. E. Crofts

& Sons paid $7,571.31 of premiums. After deducting the
original equity account balance, the combined premiums
generated total funds of $10,075.55.

(R. 90-91, Letter

Exhibit)
In soliciting Kaibab Industries1 insurance business,
billing for and collecting premiums, and insuring its employees,
both the Trustees and J. E. Crofts & Sons invited, sanctioned
and ratified Kaibab Industries as a participant in the Group
Insurance Plan.

(Trust Agreement Exhibit, Article III, §2;

Article V, §2) When Kaibab Industries terminated its participation in the plan and requested a pro rata share of the
equity account trust fund, J. E. Crofts & Sons objected and
claimed the entire fund.

The Trustees then took the position

that it was up to the participants to agree on a division of
the fund before distribution would be made.

(R. 46, 58)

The

participants could not agree and the Trustees interpleaded
the fund.
Hereafter, the Defendant-Appellant, J. E. Crofts &
Sons,will be referred to as "J. E. CROFTS" and the DefendantRespondent, Kaibab Industries, will be referred to as "KAIBAB".
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POINT I
THE LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT CREATING A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST AND
AWARDING A PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF THE INTERPLEADED FUND TO
EACH PARTY WAS PROPER AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
Should equity and good conscience permit J. E. Crofts
to take the entire trust fund or should it and Kaibab each
receive a proportionate share to prevent unjustice and unjust
enrichment?
In response to that query, a brief comparison of the
insurance fund activities of each firm during the 1965-1969 time
frame draws the main issue into sharp focus. During this period,
J. E. Crofts, although not an insurance broker, solicited,
collected and remitted to the Trustees 35 insurance premium
payments by Kaibab totalling $69,527.77.

(R. 90-91)

In the

same period J. E. Crofts made similar premium payments totalling
only $7,571.31.

In 1966-1967, J. E. Crofts received and retained

dividends amounting to $4,871.52.

(Letter Exhibit)

Based on

this activity and its status as a member of the Automobile
Dealers Association, it claims the whole trust fund balance
of $10,075.55.

Kaibab in 1965 paid $9,635.25 directly to the

Trustees in 5 premium payments.
$69,527.77 via J. E. Crofts.

Then from 1966 into 1968 paid

In 1968-1969, Kaibab received

and paid direct billings amounting to $10,566.25. Total
premium payments by Kaibab $89,729.27.

(R. 90-91)

Of all

premium payments in relation to the trust account Kaibab paid
92.2% and J. E. Crofts paid the balance of 7.8%.
-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In view of these facts, the lower court's findings
and judgment (R. 134) adopting a constructive trust for the
fund, are like the sower's seeds which fell upon good ground,
that is, the prevention of unjust enrichment.

In Corpus

Juris Secundum, Trusts, the basis and elements of constructive
trusts are described:
"A constructive trust is a creature of equity,
defined supra §15 as a remedial device by which
the holder of legal title is held to be a trustee
for the benefit of another, who in good conscience
is entitled to the beneficial interest... A
constructive trust lacks the attributes of a true
trust, that is, it has none of the elements of
an express trust and is not a fiduciary relationship, but it is a fiction imposed as an equitable
device for achieving justice." 89 CJS Trusts §139,
p. 1015.
"Generally, any transaction may be the basis for
creating a constructive trust where for any
reason Defendant holds funds which in equity
and good conscience should be possessed by
Plaintiff. The forms and varieties of constructive
trusts are practically without limit, such trusts
being raised, broadly speaking, whenever necessary
to prevent injustice." 89 CJS Trusts §142, p. 1027.
Appellant argues that the existence of fraud and deception is a
mandatory prerequisite to the adoption of a constructive trust.
"But the impact of the constructive trust is not limited to
circumstances comprised within the term fraud:
'A constructive trust is the formula through
which the conscience of equity finds expression.
When property has been acquired in such circumstances
that the holder of the legal title may not in good
conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity
converts him into a trustee.1
'A court of equity in decreeing a constructive
trust is bound by no unyielding formula. The
-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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equity of the transaction must shape the measure
of relief.'
'A constructive trust arises where a person who
holds title to property is subject to an equitable
duty to convey it to another on the ground that
he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted
to retain it."
Cases on the LAW OF TRUSTS, George G. Bogert and
Dallin H. Oaks (1967), p. 318.
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted this concept in a
number of cases, creating a constructive trust if warranted by
the facts or denying the same depending on the circumstances.
In Haws, et al vs. Jensen, 209 P. 2d 229, 116 Utah
212, an action was brought to impress a trust upon certain real
property.

The Court reviewed the law of constructive trusts

at pages 216 and 217 quoting with approval from the Restatement
of the Law of Trusts and Bogert on Trusts and Trustees:
"Admittedly there is no writing evidencing
Mrs. Haws1 intention that the property conveyed
by her be held in trust by Amber. However, under
certain circumstances existing at the time a
conveyance in trust is made, no writing evidencing
an intent to create a trust is required. In those
instances, equity will impress a constructive trust
upon the property in favor of the person or persons
designated by the Grantor as the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the oral trust. A constructive trust,
being an equitable remedy to prevent unjust enrichment, arises by operation of law and is not within
the statute of frauds
*...."
11

A Court of equity in decreeing a constructive
trust, is bound by no unyielding formula, but is
free to effect justice according to the equities
peculiar to each transaction wherever a failure
to perform a duty to convey property would result
in unjust enrichment."

See, Taylor v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 39, 43; 492 P. 2d 1343.
-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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See also, 3 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, Part I,
1946 Ed., §471 at pages 5 and 6 defining a constructive trust.
Although not a necessary element in a constructive
trust, a fiduciary relationship can lend support.
on Trusts, §462.1, pages 3414-3415.

See, Scott

In this case, the mutual

business dealings and transactions of all of the parties in
connection with the trust fund sustained a confidential and
fiduciary relation.

In fact, the Trustees1 construction of the

Trust Agreement permitting Kaibab1s participation with J. E.
Crofts1 knowledge and involvement virtually made Kaibab part
of the express trust.
"The Trustee shall have power to construe the
provisions of this agreement and the terms
used herein and any construction adopted by
the Trustees in good faith shall be binding
upon all the parties hereto." (Emphasis added.)
Trust Agreement Exhibit, Article V, Section 2.
For a period of four years, the Trustees

operating

under said Agreement accepted therein the money or property
of Kaibab and by so doing held the same for the uses and
purposes of the trust for Kaibab's benefit as provided in
Trust Agreement Exhibit, Article III, Section 2 thereof:
"The trustees named in the preceding section of
this article, by their execution of this agreement and declaration of trust, hereby accept
the trusteeship and declare that they will
receive and hold the subscribers1 contributions
and any other money or property which may come
into their hands by virtue of this instrument
as trustees thereunder for the uses, purposes,
and trusts, and with the powers and duties herein
set forth and none other." (Emphasis added.)
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Kaibab submits that the Trustees and J. E. Crofts
should be bound by their conduct with Kaibab pursuant to the
foregoing trust provisions.

The Trustees construed said agree-

ment to permit Kaibab's participation therein, insured its
employees, billed it, accepted its premium payments, and in
essence, treated it the same as any other subscriber.

The

Trustees should continue a similar course of conduct in making
distribution of the fund and deliver to Kaibab that portion
attributable to Kaibab's participation.

It would be an abuse

of the existing confidential and fiduciary business relationship to
do otherwise.
Compare, Hawkins vs. Perry, 123 Utah 16, 253 P. 2d 372,
where a constructive trust was imposed to prevent unjust enrichment in a confidential relationship.
J. E. Crofts previously received $4,851.72 in dividends
from the fund, virtual reimbursement of the 1965 fund balance,
and have had the use and benefit of the same for several years.
If J. E. Crofts were to receive the current $10,075.55 fund
balance, it would have full reimbursement of the $7,571.31
premiums paid since 1965 plus $2,504.25 to boot.

This would be

a 133% return directly on premium payments (emphasis added) made
by J. E. Crofts, plus four years of insurance coverage on its
employees at no expense.
Crofts?

Would not this unjustly enrich J. E.

If considered a fee or commission for handling 35 of

Kaibab's premiums, the return would be even more gross. Certainly,
this is a proper case for restitution of the fund to the parties
whose payments created it, including Kaibab.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It is noted that when the Restatement of Trusts was
in preparation, it was decided not to include constructive
trusts, but to deal with them in a Restatement of Restitution.
Scott, Constructive Trusts, 71 L. Q. Rev. 39 (1955) . In an
earlier article, Scott and Seavey discuss the broad scope of
the constructive trust in making restitution as follows:
"The broad scope of the constructive trust is
indicated in the Restatement, which states that
a constructive trust arises where a person holding
title to property is subject to an equitable duty
to convey it to another on the ground that he
would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to
retain it. The conception of the Restatement is
that a constructive trust is a remedy created to
enforce a right of restitution arising out of
unjust enrichment, and that it arises in every
case where a benefit consisting of property has
been received as to which there is a duty to make
restitution to another. This broad conception
of the scope of the constructive trust is expressed
by Mr. Justice Cardozo. He says: 'When property
has been acquired in such circumstances that the
holder of the legal title may not in good conscience
retain the beneficial interest, equity converts
him into a trustee1. Dean Pound has spoken of the
use of the constructive trust as affording 'specific
restitution of a received benefit in order to prevent
unjust enrichment'; and he has pointed out that the
constructive trust, unlike the express trust, is a
remedial and not a substantive institution."
(Emphasis added.)
Scott and Seavey, Restitution, 54 L. Q. Rev. 29,
41 (1938). See also, Scott on Trusts, §462.2 at
3417, 3418.
By use of the constructive trust, the lower Court has
restored each party to the status quo, each receiving that which
was properly expected at the outset.

One can speculate indefinitely

about what the respective duties and obligations of the parties
-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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would have been, if this event or that had occurred, such as
mismanagement of the fund by the Trustees, etc.
such facts are before the Court.

However, no

Both parties on appeal

submitted the matter on the basis that there was no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that judgment should be
rendered as a matter of law.

The lower Court entered its

Judgment on sound legal ground, which Judgment should be
affirmed by this Court.

POINT II
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT ARE PRESUMED TO
BE VALID AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED UNLESS THE APPELLANT SUSTAINS
ITS BURDEN OF SHOWING ERROR.
After the pleadings were in and discovery completed,
the parties met with the trial Court in a pretrial conference
on October 29, 1974.

(Letter Exhibit)

At the conclusion of

said conference, it was stipulated that the matter would be
submitted to the Court for final determination on Defendants'
joint motions for summary judgment.

(R. 136)

Thereafter, on

November 15, 1974, the matter was submitted for final determination on arguments and memorandums of counsel.

(R. 137)

There

is no dispute over the material facts as found by the Court in
its decision.

(R. 134)

And formal findings of fact and

conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions for
summary judgment.

Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

However, the Court clearly determined that the disputed
fund was produced as the result of refunds and dividends from
the payment of insurance premiums by the Defendants and from no
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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other source, that payments were "loaded" and that refunds
would be in order based on experience, that Kaibab paid 92.2%
and J. E. Crofts paid 7.8% of the total premium payments, and
that Kaibab was not a member and J. E. Crofts was a member of
the U.A.D.A.

(R. 134)

Thereupon, the Court as a matter of

law imposed a constructive trust upon the fund entitling
each Defendant to a proportionate interest based on contributions thereto.

(R. 134)

The constructive trust has been called "the most
important contribution of equity to the remedies for the
prevention of unjust enrichment".
Enrichment 26 (1951).

See, J. Dawson, Unjust

Since the judgment herein is founded

in equity, this Court may review questions of both fact and
law for the purpose of rectifying errors where the record
does not support the findings or where it clearly preponderates
against them.

See, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 9.

Upon such

review, the findings and conclusions of the trial Court are
entitled to a presumption of validity, together with recognition
that the burden is upon the Appellant to show that they are in
error.

See, Latimer vs. Katz, 29 Utah 2d 280, 283; 508 P. 2d

542 (1973).
This doctrine has been expressed by this Court by
similar language in a variety of equity cases:
(1)

In an action for a decree impressing certain
realty with a trust and for an accounting and
other relief, the Court stated, "We will,
however, not disturb the findings of fact unless
it appears that the trial judge made findings
-14-
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against the weight of the evidence." Peterson v.
Peterson, 112 Utah 554, 138; 190 P. 2d 135.
(2)

In a boundary line case, the Court held, "although
the question...is a matter of equity, we will
reverse the trial Court's findings of fact only
if we conclude that they are clearly erroneous."
Nunley v. Walker, 13 Utah 2d 105, 112; 369 P. 2d
117.

(3)

In a proceeding for settlement of partnership
accounts, the Court ruled:
"... we do not disturb his findings and
judgment merely because we might have viewed
the matter differently, but would do so only
if it appeared that the evidence clearly
preponderates against them, or that he has
so abused his discretion, or misapplied the
law, that an injustice has resulted."
Corbet v. Corbet, 24 Utah 2d 378, 381; 472
P. 2d 430.

(4)

Many divorce cases enunciate and support these
principles. See, Stone v. Stone, 19 Utah 2d 378,
380; 431 P. 2d 802 and citations therein.

(5)

In an action to quiet title to realty, the Court
said:
"... we review the trial Court's findings
of fact but overturn them only where it is
manifest that the trial Court has misapplied
proven facts or made findings clearly against
the weight of the evidence." Metropolitan
Investment Company v. Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36, 40;
376 P. 2d 940.
Where is the clear error which overcomes the presumption

in favor of the trial court?

Where is the injustice in this judg-

ment that must be overturned?
to be substituted in its stead?
to be found herein.

Or where is the better judgment
We submit that there is none

And that Appellant has not overcome its

established burden.

-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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CONCLUSION
The two Defendant corporations (Appellant and
Respondent herein) have always been separate and distinct
business entities.

The Plaintiff Trustees construed the

insurance trust agreement to permit Kaibab's participation
in the group insurance plan.

The Trustees and J. E. Crofts,

a subscriber, both participated actively in the arrangement,
soliciting Kaibab1s insurance business.

J. E. Crofts acted

as a conduit for some of Kaibab's premium payments.

For four

years the Trustees insured Kaibabfs employees and Kaibab paid
the Trustees $89,729.27 in premiums.

Neither J. E. Crofts or

its shareholders employed Kaibab's personnel or paid their
insurance premiums.

On its few employees, J. E. Crofts did

pay $7,571.31 in premiums.
As in any such group insurance plan to which the
parties could subscribe, these premiums were "loaded" and
dividends and refunds payable based on the experience of the
carrier.

During the time the fund was created, Kaibab paid

92.2% and J. E. Crofts paid 7.8% of the total premium payments.
J. E. Crofts claims the entire fund thus created.

Kaibab claims

that each party should have its pro rata share.
J. E. Crofts is in the anomalous position of approving
and participating in Kaibab's payment of premiums creating
the trust fund, but when dividends and refunds are to be paid
out of the fund, it insists that Kaibab receive nothing and it
receive everything!

This would amount to a 133% return on J. E.
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Crofts1 premiums.

Can equity and good conscience permit such

enrichment to J. E. Crofts and corresponding detriment to Kaibab?
We submit that the remedial device of a constructive
trust to prevent or redress this unjust enrichment and make
restitution should prevail in this case and distribution of the
trust fund made proportionately to each of the parties in
accordance with the Judgment of the Lower Court.
Respectfully submitted,
NORMAN H. JACKSON
Mattsson, Jackson & Mclff
151 North Main Street
Richfield, Utah 84701
Attorneys for DefendantRespondent
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